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Key Points 
 
• If the Barnett formula is rigorously applied to determine the budget of the Welsh 
Assembly Government, this will ultimately adversely affect the economy of Wales by 
limiting the growth in aggregate demand.  
• This effect is reinforced now that population weights determining rises in expenditure 
in Wales (and Scotland and Northern Ireland) are regularly up-dated. 
• There is some controversy in Wales about whether some form of needs-assessment 
exercise would favour Wales relative to its current position. What is clear is that the 
outcome of a rigorous, long term application of the Barnett formula would be a share 
of UK public expenditures in Wales (and Scotland and Northern Ireland) that was 
almost certainly below the level that would be dictated by any conventional 
understanding of ‘needs’. 
• The impact of the tax-varying power favoured by the Richard Commission is 
ambiguous, with the direction of effects dependent on the reaction of the current 
labour force and potential migrants.  
• If workers insist on full compensation for loss of income to tax through a rise in gross 
wages a tax rise would lead to an economic contraction. However, if workers value 
the additional public services financed by the tax rise as equal to their loss of 
disposable income, this effect can be avoided. Much in other words would depend on 
how the proceeds of the tax rise were spent 
 
 
In Chapter 10 of its 2004 Report, the Richard Commission provides an analysis of The 
Financing of Devolved Government. The Report first considers the ‘present funding 
arrangements’ and then proceeds to discuss ‘tax-varying powers’. The discussion, as far 
as it goes, is sensible and informative. However, it is important to recognize that the 
Richard Commission’s report is restrictive in scope. In particular, the discussion of the 
advantages and disadvantages of both present arrangements and tax-varying powers is 
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conducted without any analysis of the likely wider consequences for the economy of 
Wales of these arrangements, or alternatives to them.  
 
The purpose of the present briefing is to begin to fill this gap in our knowledge. We 
report key results of a systematic exploration of the current funding arrangements and 
tax-varying powers using a complex model of the Welsh economy.  
 
Present funding arrangements 
 
The Richard Commission reflects the traditional concerns of the literature on the Barnett 
formula, which anticipate falling expenditures per capita in the devolved regions. One 
key feature of the formula is that Wales’s initial ‘beneficial’ position, whereby its 
expenditure share exceeds its population share in the base year (in the late 1970s), is 
preserved in the form of a fixed amount of nominal expenditure. However, the real value 
of this expenditure and its importance relative to nominal government expenditure in 
England falls with growth in the latter. The Barnett formula implies that Wales’s share of 
expenditure will fall through time, towards its population share, as nominal expenditure 
in England increases. This is what underlies claims about a “Barnett Squeeze”. 
  
But the traditional literature on the Barnett formula ignores the implications of changes in 
government expenditures for regional demand, activity and populations. The analysis of 
the Richard Commission shares this limitation. Yet government expenditure is an 
important component of regional demand that has significant impacts on economic 
activity and employment, which in turn stimulate migration and population change. 
Under the present system in which population weights in the Barnett formula are 
regularly up-dated, any downward pressure on population through contracting demand is 
reinforced as government expenditures are further reduced as a consequence.  
 
In Figure 1 we report the ultimate impact of strict adherence to the Barnett formula on the 
Welsh economy. If population weights are not up-dated (the case until 1997), rigorous 
adherence to the Barnett formula would eventually result in a contraction in GDP and 
population in Wales of 2.9% and just over 3% respectively, assuming labour is mobile. 
However, as we would expect, if the population weights used in the Barnett formula are 
up-dated (in this case downwards), Wales loses out further in terms of government 
expenditure. This induces additional contraction, with GDP ultimately falling by 3.9% 
and population by 4.1%.  
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Figure 1. The Long-Run Impact of Strict Adherence to the Barnett Formula 
(% Changes from Base)
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While the effects are significant, they are less than in the Scottish case, where population 
contraction is estimated to range as high as 5%.  This mainly reflects the fact that Wales 
currently has lower expenditure per capita than Scotland, and is closer to equality with 
English per capita expenditures. However, a given change in government expenditures in 
Wales is also likely to have a lesser impact because the Welsh economy is more open, 
with a higher propensity to import and higher price elasticities of demand for its traded 
goods.  
 
These results are sensitive to a number of assumptions, including the nature of the 
collective bargaining system and the degree of labour mobility. Under some 
circumstances the absence of labour mobility would make big difference, significantly 
reducing the scale of impact on GDP. 
 
There is general controversy over how important the Barnett formula actually is in 
governing the distribution of devolved expenditures among the regional governments of 
the UK. However, in Wales the dispute surrounding the treatment of EU Objective 1 
funding, and the resulting ‘Barnett plus’ arrangement has been interpreted by some as 
indicating the continuing ability of the devolved authorities to challenge the formula and 
effectively bypass it. It is not at all clear yet, though, that the very special circumstances 
that led to this arrangement indicate a more general flexibility. Furthermore, while bypass 
is always possible, if it occurs on an ad hoc, transitory basis it will merely influence the 
speed of adjustment to any ‘Barnett equilibrium’ (that it the end of the process of ‘Barnett 
squeeze, when Welsh per capita public expenditures converge on the English level), and 
not the fundamental nature of the equilibrium.  
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Of course, there is no implication that Barnett equilibria are desirable. Devolved 
expenditures in such circumstances are allocated solely on the basis of regional 
populations. While the size of regional populations is undoubtedly one indicator of 
‘needs’, it is an imperfect one since it takes no account of characteristics that lead to 
different needs across regions (e.g. age composition, degree of poverty) or to different 
costs of providing public services (e.g. geographic dispersion of the population). The 
only publicly available official ‘needs assessment’ exercise in the UK is now rather 
dated.  
 
However, some have argued that Wales would inevitably benefit from an up-date since, 
on many indicators at least, its relative position in the UK economy (for example, in 
terms of GDP per capita) has declined. We are not in a position to assess the validity of 
this view, but what is clear is that an equilibrium for the economy of Wales (and of all the 
peripheral economies of the UK) based on an up-dated needs-assessment would almost 
certainly be better than a Barnett equilibrium.  
 
A number of factors should be kept in mind when interpreting our results. First, they are 
likely to take many years to be established, even in periods of reasonably rapid nominal 
expenditure growth. Secondly, our results measure change relative to the status quo, 
which would require equi-proportionate allocations of expenditure per capita across all 
the regions of the UK, and therefore seems unlikely. It may be that other comparators 
could generate equilibria worse than Barnett equilibria. However, in practice, this seems 
unlikely because other mechanisms are likely to attribute some weight to ‘needs’ and it is 
unlikely that these would be less in the case of Wales than in England.  Finally, if 
mechanisms for distributing regional public expenditures have an important 
macroeconomic impact on the regional economies of the UK, these effects should be 
included in any overall evaluation process. 
 
Tax-varying powers 
 
The Richard Commission considers the case for and against the granting of tax-varying 
powers and concludes that ‘if a legislative Assembly is constituted it is desirable, though 
not essential, to confer tax varying powers’ and that ‘if a tax-varying power is to be 
granted the most practicable method appears to be the Scottish variable rate’.  
 
On the case against the tax-varying power the Commission cites: the  pragmatic point that 
it would probably not be used; the impact on overall financial accountability; the limited 
potential to offer much of a buffer against any tightening of the UK budget; the uncertain 
nature of the revenue stream given its sensitivity to the structure of the tax system (over 
which the Assembly would have no control); the possibility of a negative impact on 
Welsh economic activity. The key arguments in favour of a tax-varying power are 
considered to be: the Assembly’s ability to raise some additional revenue, with 
accountability to the electorate; the fact that taxes could be lowered as well as raised; the 
power to finance additional projects ‘of importance to Wales’. While some of these 
arguments acknowledge the possible importance of the wider effects of using the tax-
varying power, these are not explored.  
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What then would be the likely impact of the introduction of the tax-varying power on the 
Welsh economy? Our starting point is the UK government estimates that the revenue 
raised from a 1p increment to the standard rate of income tax in Wales in 2003/4 would 
be £120m. A 3p variation would generate a change in revenues of £360m. This was 3.5% 
of the National Assembly budget in 2003/4.  
 
The First Minister’s reference to establishing ‘clear red water’ between Cardiff Bay and 
Westminster, and the fact that the power to vary fees and charges has, so far, been 
employed to reduce them, thereby putting further pressure on the Assembly budget, 
suggest that a tax rise is more likely than a fall. We use the estimate of a £360m increase 
in revenues resulting from the 3p rise in the basic rate of income tax to calibrate the scale 
of the tax rise in our model of Wales.1  
 
We impose this tax increase on the model, with the constraint that all increments to tax 
revenues are then spent (with a composition identical to government expenditure as a 
whole). This constitutes a balanced-budget fiscal expansion. It is referred to as a fiscal 
expansion because the expectation is that the change will have a net expansionary 
demand effect. Of course, since disposable incomes fall, we would also expect 
consumption expenditures to fall. However, because of, for example, the lower import 
content of government expenditure, the fall in consumption is likely to be more than 
offset by the rise in government expenditure, so that, net, there is a stimulus to aggregate 
demand. 
 
However, there are potentially important countervailing influences operating on the 
supply-side of a regional economy such as Wales. Since workers take home pay cuts 
relative to elsewhere in the UK, Wales may become a less attractive place to work, and 
there may be out-migration. Furthermore, workers may pressure representatives to push 
for a compensating rise in the pre-tax wage in an attempt to restore the original real wage 
(‘tax shifting’). Any such supply-side effects will tend to push up wages in Wales relative 
to elsewhere and so have an adverse impact on competitiveness. The overall impact on 
output, employment and the population will therefore depend on the relative strengths of 
beneficial demand and adverse supply effects.  
 
The key to the outcome depends on the strength of the adverse supply effects: if these can 
be moderated or countered, then the probability of an overall stimulus to the Welsh 
economy would be maximised. The results in Figure 2 relate to two benchmark cases. In 
one case we assume that workers/migrants force full compensation for their lower take 
home pay through a compensating increase in the gross wage. In this case the adverse 
supply effects predominate and the balanced-budget ‘fiscal expansion’ ultimately results 
in a contraction in regional GDP of 1.96% and loss of population of just over 2%.  
 
                                                 
1 We deflate the estimates and adjust for the costs of implementing and administering the tax, on the basis 
that these account for a similar percentage of gross revenues as in Scotland (about 1.1%).  
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Figure 2. The Long-Run Impact of the Tax-Varying Power 
(3p rise in standard rate)
(Results reported as % Change from base)
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In the second case, we assume that the tax hike has no impact at all on nominal wages. 
This could arise if all workers in Wales were tied into a national wage bargaining system 
with no flexibility, but this is clearly not the case. Alternatively, even if there is regional 
wage bargaining, this outcome would result if workers as potential migrants and wage 
bargainers, judged themselves to be as well off after the imposition of the tax as before, 
and did not seek to shift the tax onto employers. This would require them to value the 
additional public services as equal to their loss of disposable income, and to moderate 
their wage claims in accordance with this valuation.  
 
In this case, neither nominal wages nor prices are affected. Of course, the real take home 
wage falls by the full amount of the tax, but workers feel compensated by the higher 
public expenditures. Since there is no adverse supply effect in this case, the demand 
effect predominates and there is an expansion of activity, with GDP and population 
rising, by 0.5% and 0.6% respectively. This pattern of results is very similar to that we 
found for Scotland, though the percentage changes are slightly smaller in the Welsh case 
(despite a slightly bigger percentage tax change), reflecting the greater openness of the 
Welsh economy. 
 
We have no way of knowing with any certainty which of these responses is most likely, 
since we do not have direct experience of such matters in the UK. However, we can 
identify factors that increase the likelihood of particular outcomes. Clearly the use of the 
tax revenues may be critical here; they have to be spent in ways that are widely and 
highly valued in Wales to maximise the probability a positive economic impact. At 
national level there is scepticism about such ‘social wage’ considerations. However, in 
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Wales there may appear to be a rather greater prospect of such an impact given its 
apparently more communitarian and egalitarian values. However, scepticism has also 
been expressed about the true strength of such values. Furthermore, the declining 
importance of national bargaining and of union membership serve perhaps to reinforce 
scepticism regarding the likely absence of induced wage effects following the use of the 
tax-varying power. 
 
Assumptions about labour mobility again prove to be important, with both negative and 
positive effects being substantially reduced in the absence of mobility. 
 
Conclusions 
 
We conclude with two observations on the limitations of our present analysis. First, we 
have focused exclusively on the financing of devolved government in Wales. Of course, 
there are other key issues in any overall assessment of the economic consequences of 
devolution for the Welsh economy, not least the impact on economic development. 
Secondly, our analysis in this paper abstracts from the spillover and feedback effects that 
no doubt in fact characterise the interregional economy of the UK. We intend to address 
these issues in future research.  
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